Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology | 哲學新媒體

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Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology

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    作者(群): Husserl, Edmund
    譯者: Cairns, Dorion
    出版社: Springer
    出版年份: 1973
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  • The Cartesian Meditations translation is based primarily on the printed text, edited by Professor S. Strasser and published in the first volume of Husserliana: Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vortrage, ISBN 90-247-0214-3. Most of Husserl's emendations, as given in the Appendix to that volume, have been treated as if they were part of the text. The others have been translated in footnotes. Secondary consideration has been given to a typescript (cited as Typescript C) on which Husserl wrote in 1933: Cartes. Meditationen / Originaltext 1929 / E. Husserl / fur Dorion Cairns. Its use of emphasis and quotation marks conforms more closely to Husserl s practice, as exemplified in works published during his lifetime. In this respect the translation usually follows Typescript C. Moreover, some of the variant readings n this typescript are preferable and have been used as the basis for the translation. Where that is the case, the published text is given or translated in a foornote. The published text and Typescript C have been compared with the French translation by Gabrielle Pfeiffer and Emmanuel Levinas (Paris, Armand Collin, 1931). The use of emphasis and quotation marks in the French translation corresponds more closely to that in Typescript C than to that in the published text. Often, where the wording of the published text and that of Typescript C differ, the French translation indicates that it was based on a text that corresponded more closely to one or the other usually to Typescript C. In such cases the French translation has been quoted or cited in a foornote.

CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
1 . Descartes' Meditations as the prototype of philosophical reflection 1
2. The necessity of a radical new beginning of philosophy 4
FIRST MEDITATION. THE WAY TO THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO
3. The Cartesian overthrow and the guiding final idea of an absolute grounding of science 7
4. Uncovering the final sense of science by becoming immersed in science qua noematic phenomenon ... 9
5. Evidence and the idea of genuine science 11
6. Differentiations of evidence. The philosophical demand for an evidence that is apodictic and first in itself 14
7. The evidence for the factual existence of the world not apodictic ; its inclusion in the Cartesian overthrow 17
8. The ego~cogito as transcendental subjectivity . ... 18
9. The range covered by apodictic evidence of the"lam" 22
10. Digression: Descartes' failure to make the transcendental turn 23
11. The psychological and the transcendental Ego. The transcendency of the world 25
SECOND MEDITATION. THE FIELD OF TRANSCENDENTAL EXPERIENCE LAID OPEN IN RESPECT OF ITS UNIVERSAL STRUCTURES
12. The idea of a transcendental grounding of knowledge 27
13. Necessity of at first excluding problems relating to the range covered by transcendental knowledge ... 29
14. The stream ofcogitationes. Cogito and cogitatum ... 31
15. Natural and transcendental reflection 33
16. Digression: Necessary beginning of both transcendental "purely psychological" reflection with the ego cogito 37
17. The two-sidedness of inquiry into consciousness as an investigation of correlatives. Lines of description. Synthesis as the primal form belonging to consciousness 39
18. Identification as the fundamental form of synthesis. The all-embracing synthesis of transcendental time 41
19. Actuality and potentiality of intentional life . ... 44
20. The peculiar nature of intentional analysis 46
21. The intentional object as "transcendental clue" ... 50
22. The idea of the universal unity comprising all objects, and the task of clarifying it constitutionally 53
THIRD MEDITATION. CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS. TRUTH AND ACTUALITY
23. A more pregnant concept of constitution, under the titles "reason" and '"unreason" 56
24. Evidence as itself-givenness and the modifications of evidence 57
25. Actuality and quasi-actuality 58
26. Actuality as the correlate of evident varification . . 59
27. Habitual and potential evidence as functioning constitutively for the sense "existing object" 60
28. Presumptive evidence of world-experience. World as an idea correlative to a perfect experiential evidence 61
29. Material and formal ontological regions as indexes pointing to transcendental systems of evidence ... 62
FOURTH MEDITATION. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS PERTAINING TO THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO HIMSELF
30. The transcendental ego inseparable from the processes making up his life 65
31. The Ego as identical pole of the subjective processes 66
32. The Ego as substrate of habitualities 66
33. The full concretion of the Ego as monad and the problem of his self-constitution 67
34. A fundamental development of phenomenological method. Transcendental analysis as eidetic 69
35. Excursus into eidetic internal psychology ..... 72
36. The transcendental ego as the universe of possible forms of subjective process. The compossibility of subjective processes in coexistence or succession as subject to eidetic laws 73
37. lime as the universal form of all egological genesis 75
38. Active and passive genesis 77
39. Association as a principle of passive genesis .... 80
40. Transition to the question of transcendental idealism 81
41. Genuine phenomenological explication of one's own "ego cogito" as transcendantal idealism 83
FIFTH MEDITATION. UNCOVERING OF THE SPHERE OF TRANSCENDENTAL BEING AS MONADOLOGICAL INTERSUBJECTIVITY
42. Exposition of the problem of experiencing someone else, in rejoinder to the objection that phenomenology entails solipsism 89
43. The noematic-ontic mode of givenness of the Other, as transcendental clue for the constitutional theory of the experience of someone else 90
44. Reduction of transcendental experience to the sphere of ownness 92
45. The transcendental ego, and self-apperception as a psychophysical man reduced to what is included in my ownness 99
46. Ownness as the sphere of the actualities and potentialities of the stream of subjective processes 100
47. The intentional object also belongs to the full monadic concretion of ownness. Immanent transcendence and primordial world 103
48. The transcendency of the Objective world as belonging to a level higher than that of primordial transcendency 105
49. Predelineation of the course to be followed by intentional explication of experiencing what is other 106
50. The mediate intentionality of experiencing someone else, as "appresentation" (analogical apperception) . 108
X CONTENTS
51 . "Pairing" as an associatively constitutive component of my experience of someone else 112
52. Appresentation as a kind of experience with its own style of verification 113
53. Potentialities of the primordial sphere and their constitutive function in the apperception of the Other 116
54. Explicating the sense of the appresentation wherein I experience someone else 117
55. Establishment of the community of monads. The first form of Objectivity: intersubjective Nature . . 120
56. Constitution of higher levels of intermonadic community 128
57. Clarification of the parallel between explication of what is internal to the psyche and egological transcendental explication 131
58. Differentiation of problems in the intentional analysis of higher intersubjective communities. I and my surrounding world 131
59. Ontological explication and its place within constitutional transcendental phenomenology as a whole . 136
60. Metaphysical results of our explication of experiencing someone else 139
61. The traditional problems of "psychological origins" and their phenomenological clarification 141
62. Survey of our intentional explication of experiencing someone else 148
CONCLUSION
63. The task of criticizing transcendental experience and knowledge , 151
64. Concluding word 152